The European Convention on Human Rights does not provide for a prisoner's right to parole and no international or regional human rights instrument provides for this right.
INTRODUCTION

In Ezeh and Connors v the United Kingdom,
1 judges Zupančič and Maruste rights bodies and from courts and legislation from different countries, I argue that there is evidence of the move towards recognising a prisoner's right to be released on parole. This is a case where a prisoner has served the required non-parole period and his continued imprisonment cannot be justified on grounds such as dangerousness. I argue that the continued imprisonment of a prisoner in such circumstances could also violate his right not to be deprived of liberty arbitrary. The article begins by highlighting the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the relationship between human rights and parole.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND PAROLE: JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The issue of the release or placement of prisoners on parole has been considered by the European Court of Human Rights in different cases. Because most of these cases do not deal with irreducible life sentences, their detailed discussion falls outside the scope of this article. These cases have dealt with issues such as the following: the unjustified continued imprisonment of the offender after the revocation of his parole as a violation of his right to liberty; 10 the continued imprisonment of the applicant after his qualification for parole as a violation of the right to liberty; 11 the delay in reviewing the applicant's eligibility for ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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released in order to reintegrate into society. 22 In Khoroshenko v Russia 23 the Court noted that the Russian "Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences mentions the possibility for a life-sentence prisoner to request release on parole after serving a period of twenty-five years" but found that "the very strict nature of the applicant's regime prevents life-sentence prisoners from maintaining contacts with their families and thus seriously complicates their social reintegration and rehabilitation instead of fostering and facilitating it." 24 Although the European Convention of Human Rights does not provide for the prisoners' right to rehabilitation, the Court has held that:
While the Convention does not guarantee, as such, a right to rehabilitation, and while Article 3 cannot be construed as imposing on the authorities an absolute duty to provide prisoners with rehabilitation or reintegration programmes and activities, such as courses or counselling, it does require the authorities to give life prisoners a chance, however remote, to someday regain their freedom. For that chance to be genuine and tangible, the authorities must also give life prisoners a proper opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. 25 States have a duty to ensure that prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment have access to rehabilitation programmes. Some judges have held that an irreducible life sentence (life sentence without the prospect of release) would violate the principle of human dignity. 26 The Court held that life imprisonment without real prospect of release violates Article 3 of the Convention. 27 In a case against Hungary, the Court noted that the regulation relating to the release of offenders sentenced to life imprisonment must "guarantee a proper consideration of the changes and the progress towards rehabilitation made by the prisoner." 28 The Court also held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is not contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights if "national law and practice afford the possibility of a dedicated judicial review of the life sentence imposed on the applicant." 29 The above jurisprudence shows that the law and practice should provide for the possibility of releasing an offender sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Court does not hold that such an offender has a right to be released on parole. It is axiomatic that a prisoner cannot be detained unless there are legitimate penological grounds for that detention. As was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Bieber and the Chamber in its judgment in the present case, these grounds will include punishment, deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation. Many of these grounds will be present at the time when a life sentence is imposed. However, the balance between these justifications for detention is not necessarily static and may shift in the course of the sentence. What may be the primary justification for detention at the start of the sentence may not be so after a lengthy period into the service of the sentence. It is only by carrying out a review of the justification for continued detention at an appropriate point in the sentence that these factors or shifts can be properly evaluated. 112. Moreover, if such a prisoner is incarcerated without any prospect of release and without the possibility of having his life sentence reviewed, there is the risk that he can never atone for his offence: whatever the prisoner does in prison, however exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation, his punishment remains fixed and unreviewable. If anything, the punishment becomes greater with time: the longer the prisoner lives, the longer his sentence. Thus, even when a whole life sentence is condign punishment at the time of its imposition, with the passage of time it becomes -to paraphrase Lord Justice Laws in Wellington -a poor guarantee of just and proportionate punishment (see paragraph 54 above). 113. Furthermore, as the German Federal Constitutional Court recognised in the Life Imprisonment case (see paragraph 69 above), it would be incompatible with the provision on human dignity in the Basic Law for the State forcefully to deprive a person of his freedom without at least providing him with the chance to someday regain that freedom. It was that conclusion which led the Constitutional Court to find that the prison authorities had the duty to strive towards a life sentenced prisoner's rehabilitation and that rehabilitation was constitutionally required in any community that established human dignity as its centrepiece. Indeed, the Constitutional Court went on to make clear in the subsequent War Criminal case that this applied to all life prisoners, whatever the nature of their crimes, and that release only for those who were infirm or close to death was not sufficient (see paragraph 70 above). Similar considerations must apply under the Convention system, the very essence of which, as the Court has often stated, is respect for human dignity ...."
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016 76 punishment and deterrence have not yet been entirely fulfilled or because the applicant's continued detention is justified by reason of his dangerousness. 34 The Court (majority) does not hold expressly that an offender has a right to parole. It reaffirms the Grand Chamber's judgement in Vinter that an offender, irrespective of the sentence he is serving, has two rights: the right to a prospect of release and the right to a review of his sentence. 35 firstly, 'the parole mechanism must be placed under the authority of a court or at least under full judicial review both of the factual and the legal elements of the decision"; 39 second, "the parole review must take place within a pre-determined, reasonable timeframe"; 40 and last:
The criteria for assessing the appropriateness of parole must be established by law in a clear and foreseeable manner and be based primarily on special preventive considerations, and secondarily on general preventive considerations.
Considerations of general prevention alone should not be used to justify refusal 34 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., para 13.
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of parole or recall to prison. The criteria should not be limited to the prisoner's mental or physical infirmity or closeness to death. Such "compassionate grounds" are clearly too restrictive. 41 The judge added that:
The existence of a clear and predictable legal framework which enshrines the right to parole of all prisoners, including those who have committed the most "heinous crimes", is an international obligation of member States, and compliance with international human rights law does not hinge on how shocking the factual circumstances of each case are. 42 In the above judgement the judge makes it very clear that an offender has the right to parole and lays down the circumstances that must be in place for such a right to be protected, promoted, fulfilled and realised. The judge adopted the same approach in a subsequent case. 43 In order to assess whether the above holding could have international appeal, it is helpful to have a look at the approach that some international human rights bodies have taken with regards to the issue of the prisoners' right to parole.
THE RIGHT TO PAROLE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES
As previously mentioned, international human rights treaties do not provide shows that the issue of parole was not dealt with in the submissions made by states which participated in the drafting process. 44 The Human Rights Committee (HRC)
has not held expressly that an offender has a right to parole. The HRC has, however, held that "a life sentence without parole…may raise issues under article 7 of the Covenant, in the light of the objectives of punishment as enshrined in article 10, paragraph 3, of the Covenant." 45 It has, however, held that once the offender 41 Ibid., para 14. 42 Ibid. 43 In Murray v The Netherlands, Application no. 10511/10 (April 26, 2016), para 13 (Partly Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque) it was held that "if a parole mechanism must be available to those convicted of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori it must be available to other prisoners. It would fly in the face of justice if offenders convicted of less serious offences could not be paroled whenever they are apt to reintegrate society, while such an opportunity would be afforded to offenders convicted of more serious crimes. Thus, in principle, the Convention guarantees a right to parole to all prisoners." 44 ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016
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has served the non-parole period, he must be considered for parole. The
Committee held that:
The Committee considers that the remaining authors' detention for preventive purposes, that is, protection of the public, once a punitive term of imprisonment has been served, must be justified by compelling reasons, reviewable by a judicial authority, that are and remain applicable as long as detention for these purposes continues. The requirement that such continued detention be free from arbitrariness must thus be assured by regular periodic reviews of the individual case by an independent body, in order to determine the continued justification of detention for purposes of protection of the public. 46 The Human Rights Committee observed in a case in which Australia sentenced juveniles to life imprisonment and they were required to serve 30 years before being considered for parole that:
The Committee considers that the imposition of life sentences on the authors as juveniles can only be compatible with article 7, read together with articles 10, paragraph 3, and 24 of the Covenant if there is a possibility of review and a prospect of release, notwithstanding the gravity of the crime they committed and the circumstances around it. That does not mean that release should necessarily be granted. It rather means that release should not be a mere theoretical possibility and that the review procedure should be a thorough one, allowing the domestic authorities to evaluate the concrete progress made by the authors towards rehabilitation and the justification for continued detention, in a context that takes into consideration the fact that they were 14 and 15, respectively, at the time they committed the crime. 47 The Human Rights Committee has held that there are circumstances in which the recall of an offender on parole to continue serving his sentence in prison could be arbitrary and therefore contrary to the ICCPR. 48 In a case where Spain amended its parole legislation to apply retrospectively which meant that the author had to serve his entire sentence without parole, the HRC held that it "cannot conclude that … the denial of parole to the author made his imprisonment for the entire duration of his sentence arbitrary within the meaning of article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. 10." 49 The HRC did not find New Zealand to be in violation of the Convention, although it amended its law to empower courts to impose lengthy nonparole periods and most importantly the Committee noted "in this respect that 46 50 The HRC declared that parole legislation should be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner. 51 It is clear that the Human Rights Committee has held that an offender does not have a right to be released on parole. However, there has to be a prospect that the offender will be released.
Like the ICCPR, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is silent on the right to parole. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights is yet to hold that a prisoner has a right to parole. However, the African Commission has recommended to some states parties to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights to amend their laws and provide for parole. 52 In the light of the fact that many countries, including all of the countries discussed below, 53 sentenced to a determinate sentence, or to life imprisonment, is the same regardless of the date the prisoner was sentenced. 57 Similarly, in Wiggil v S, 58 in which the appellant's previous conviction was considered for the purpose of imposing a subsequent sentence, the court observed that "[h]ad the magistrate ordered that the sentence run concurrently with that imposed in the previous matter, she would, in effect, not have been punished for this offence save insofar as it may have had a potential effect on her right to parole in the future." 59 In the third category one finds cases in which courts have held that an offender has a right to be considered for parole after serving the prescribed minimum term of imprisonment (non-parole period 59 Ibid., para 8. 60 
Van Gund v Minister of Correctional Services and Others, 2011 (1) SACR 16 (GNP).
81
It is trite law that a prisoner has no right to be released on parole. He, however, has a right to be considered. Furthermore once an offender has been lawfully sentenced by a court of law he or she has no right to liberty. That right to liberty is deprived by process of law after he/she has been sentenced. The right to be considered for parole should not be equated to the right to be freed from prison.
That right only arises once the [Parole] Board decides to grant parole. The right to be considered for parole is an administrative action and consequently a prisoner is entitled to a fair procedure. Section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 provides that "Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair". 61 The court in the above decision mentions two important rights: the right to be considered for parole and that right to the released from prison. The latter right only arises once the offender has been granted parole. In other words, it is not a right to parole. This reasoning has been followed in subsequent high court decisions. 62 In another case, the high court held that:
The granting of parole is not a right that can be claimed by an applicant, it is a privilege as in terms of section 73(1)(a) of the Correctional Services Act…a sentenced offender is to remain in correctional centre for a full term of his sentence subject to the provisions of section 73(6)(a). The Act makes provision for consideration of placement on parole and not the actual placement on parole.
What a sentenced offender … enjoys is the right to be considered for parole. 63 The Constitutional Court 64 and other divisions of the high court have also observed that an offender has a right to be considered for parole. 65 This means that the offender will have to be considered for placement on parole whether or not he makes an application to the parole board to be considered for parole. The question is: at what stage does the offender's right to be considered for parole arise? In S v Bull and Another 66 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the lengthy sentence imposed on the offender "could be unjustified as it would deprive the accused of the right to be considered for parole when he might no longer be dangerous." 67 This reasoning has been followed in subsequent case law. 68 Implied
However, in Canada a prisoner has "a right to parole should one's physical/mental health is likely to suffer serious damage on account of continued incarceration." 81 In some cases some Canadian courts have held, though in passing, that an offender has a right to parole. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Board must order that a prisoner who is liable to serve a total period of imprisonment of less than five years and for whom a non-parole period has been fixed be released from prison or home detention on parole on a day specified by the Board, being a day-(a) where, because the commencement of the non-parole period has been back dated, the non-parole period expires prior to the date on which it is fixed, not later than 30 days after the day on which it is fixed; or (b) in any other case, not later than 30 days after the day on which the non-parole period expires.
In R v Franceschini 90 the Supreme Court of South Australia held that "[u]nder section 66 of the Correctional Services Act, some types of prisoners have an automatic right to parole at the expiration of a non-parole period of less than five years." 91 In other words, an offender who was sentenced to more than five years' imprisonment "has no automatic right to parole." 92 The position is also the same in Turkey 93 and there evidence that some offenders have been granted automatic parole. 94 The Court of Appeal of Vanuatu, without elaborating, imposed two sentences on an offender and ordered that they should run concurrently "subject to ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 1 2016 85 the right to parole." 95 The Supreme Court Vanuatu took into consideration the time the offender had spent in custody awaiting trial in calculating the sentence to impose of him because it did not want him to lose his "right of Parole." 96 In India, a high court held that an offender has a right to parole.
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CONCLUSION
The above discussion has shown that generally in international human rights law an offender does not have a right to be released on parole. However, once he has served the non-parole period, he has to be considered for parole and his continued imprisonment has to be justified by compelling reasons. The same approach has also been followed in some of the jurisdictions discussed in this article. In Australia where courts have held that an offender has the right to parole, this has been so because legislation provides for that right. In South Africa courts have taken different approaches on the question of whether an offender has the right to parole. Therefore, Judge Pinto De Albuquerque's decision that an offender has a right to parole should be understood in the context in which it was made and especially in the light of the three guarantees that he held must be in place for this right to be realised. But the soundness of his conclusion should not be dismissed easily. The right to parole he refers to arises when the offender's continued imprisonment cannot be justified. This means that the right to parole arises at the time when the offender justifiably qualifies for it. This is the same with some other rights. For example, the right to healthcare only arises when a person can justifiably claim it -when that person is sick; the right to not to be denied emergency medical treatment arises when a person needs that treatment; and the right to vote arises when a person is of voting age and meets other requirements such as citizenship. It should also be noted that the list of human rights is not closed. Whenever society advances to another level of development new rights emerge. In the light of the fact that imprisonment is used in all parts of the world and that the issue of the release of offenders on parole has started to attract the attention of international and regional human rights bodies, the time has come for this right to be given enough attention in national and international human rights instruments. The moment the right to parole is recognised, it is accompanied by some obligations. 
